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                                                          Abstract 
The main aim of this paper is to shed more light on the portfolio behaviour of the 
older part of the UK population over the period 1988-94. We utilize data from the 
Retirement Survey and we employ different econometric specifications in order to 
model the risky asset ownership decisions over time. The unique nature of the dataset 
allows us to control for a variety of factors (pension rights, receipt of a lump sum, 
timing of retirement, changes in retirement status) that may be important for the 
portfolio behaviour of those people that are about to or they have recently retired. Our 
results are indicative for the role of the fixed participation costs and inertial behaviour 
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1. Introduction 
The study of household portfolio choices has become an increasingly popular 
area of research in recent years.
1 The analysis of micro data on household finances 
from many countries suggests that only few households choose to hold risky financial 
assets despite of the higher expected return premia that these investments offer. A 
common observed phenomenon is the limited degree of diversification within and 
across different asset categories, in contrast to the predictions of the standard pricing 
models. Theory and empirical research have identified the fixed entry costs that the 
risky asset ownership entails as the key factor behind this participation puzzle. Other 
factors that may influence the household portfolio choices include the uninsured 
background risks, the informational and monitoring costs and the liquidity constraints 
that many households face.  
The exploration of UK households’ portfolio decisions and in particular 
investments in risky financial assets has not received great attention, primarily due to 
the limited information of the available household surveys. However, recent data on 
UK households from the Family Resources Survey, the BHPS (wave V) and the 
Retirement Survey offer interesting information upon asset holdings and main wealth 
components. The study of UK households’ portfolio choices are of special interest. 
The decade of 80’s was a period of dramatic macroeconomic changes which crucially 
influenced the composition of household portfolios. The privatisation of large 
nationalized industries in the mid-eighties altered distinctively the percentage of those 
holding risky assets. (More than one out of five households owned risky financial 
assets in the late 80’s, while this percentage did not exceed the 10% prior to the 
                                                 
1 For the first systematic collection of both theoretical and empirical works in the area, see the recently 
published volume by Guiso, Haliassos and Jappeli (2001).   2 
privatisation episode.)
2 In addition, the “right to buy policy”, which gave the right to 
the tenants of publicly owned houses to buy the house that they lived at prices lower 
than the market prices, had considerable implications for households’ housing wealth. 
Furthermore, the strong incentives that were given for private pension plans during 
the 80’s altered, to some extent, the way that people saved for their retirement. All the 
above stylised facts make interesting the analysis of UK household portfolios. 
In this paper we utilize panel data from the Retirement Survey (waves 88 and 
94). The use of UK data from this source is interesting for two more reasons:          
i)  The sample consists of individuals that are close to the retirement age or they have 
recently retired. Exploring portfolio decisions made by the elderly is of particular 
interest since various factors (pension status and coverage, bequest motives, health 
risks) are likely to affect their savings choices.
3 
ii)  The sample period, although starting after the macroeconomic changes of the mid-
eighties, has been marked by the substantial changes in housing wealth, the dominant 
component in households’ total wealth. (Housing prices boomed in the late 80’s, 
followed by a period of severe slump in prices up to the market’s levelling-out around 
1994.)   
For an earlier research on households’ assets and wealth based on Retirement 
Survey data see Disney et al. (1995) and Disney et al. (1998). The current study has 
focused on the exploration of risky assets ownership decisions and how these have 




                                                 
2 According to figures from the FES – see Banks and Smith (2001). 
3 For a recent study on US elderly households see Hurd (2001).   3 
2.  Data 
In this paper we employ panel data from the two waves (1988/ 89 and 1994) 
of the Retirement Survey. The 1988/ 89 survey interviews those individuals within 
households that are between 55 and 69 years old (“key respondents”) and their 
spouses even if they are outside this age group (distinguished as “key” and “non-key” 
spouses). The term “key benefit unit” is used to describe a benefit unit with at least 
one key respondent (they consist of either a single person or two persons, usually a 
couple). The 1994 follow-up survey interviewed the “key respondents” and their 
spouses. (The “non-key spouses” from the original survey are not eligible for the 1994 
survey in their own right, and they are not interviewed if the key respondent is not 
interviewed.)   
Our analysis can be developed in two levels: 
i)  An individual level, where we consider the “key respondents” as distinct decision 
units. The balanced panel consists of 2,248 “key respondents”, a “moving” age cell of 
individuals who were in the 55 to 69 age group in 1988/ 89 (3,543 individuals 
comprise the full unbalanced panel). 
ii)  A benefit unit level, where the “key benefit unit” is treated as the unit of analysis 
(income and wealth variables are aggregated at the benefit unit level while 
demographics are defined over the head). The household head is considered to be the 
benefit unit head, while in the cases that he/ she is not included in the “key benefit 
unit” the man is considered as the head (or the eldest of the two persons of the same 
gender). The balanced panel consists of those “key benefit units” that their head is 
interviewed in both waves (1,539 cases)
4.  More than 95% of the benefit unit heads 
                                                 
4 From the 1,662 benefit units that were interviewed in both waves we have to exclude the 123 where 
the head was not interviewed in 1994. The full unbalanced panel consists of 2,577 benefit units 
providing information apart from the 3,543 “key respondents” on their 620 “non-key” spouses (11 of 
those have been interviewed for first time in 1994 as new spouses).   4 
are “key respondents” which means that we do not expect serious differences in the 
results between these two levels of analysis.  
In the first part of this paper (section 3) we exploit information from the full 
unbalanced panel of the “key benefit units”. The analysis gives insight for the 
portfolio behaviour of benefit units with at least one of their members aged 55 to 69 in 
1988. In the second part (sections 4 and 5), the models that we estimate are based 
exclusively on balanced panels. In this case we facilitate a significantly higher 
number of observations for the estimation by using data on “key respondents”. (In 
addition, the analysis on an individual level may give us a clearer picture for the 
impact of unobserved heterogeneity which is inflated - in some cases - from changes 
in the composition of benefit units over time.)  
The economic variables used have been deflated using the Consumer Price 
Index
5 and all the values are expressed in constant 1994 prices. In the regression 
analysis we control for age and time effects, nevertheless we do not control for cohort 





3. Panel Data Static Models for Discrete Choices  
i. Random Effects Probit model 
In this section we present models that exploit information from the panel 
dimension of the data. The main aim is to model and explore the binary choice of 
owning versus not owning risky assets by taking into account the unobserved 
                                                 
5 OECD, Economic Outlook, 1994. 
6 As an alternative we could control for cohort, age and time effects which are restricted to sum up to 
zero (Deaton and Paxson (1994)). This leads to results with a less plausible interpretation.   5 
heterogeneity. We control for various demographic characteristics  (defined over the 
head) like age, a crucial factor for the understanding of stockownership decisions.
7 
Other demographic factors that we control for are the gender, the marital status, 
children (that may serve as an indication of a bequest motive) and whether the head 
has more than standard education. Higher education usually implies better knowledge 
of financial matters which results to lower information and monitoring costs. 
Reported health problems are used as an approximation for “health risk”, a source of 
risk that is likely to affect household attitudes towards portfolio risk.  
The survey provides information mainly on individuals that are close to the 
retirement age or they have recently retired. For this reason we control for the impact 
of factors like the retirement status, the timing of retirement as a result of the financial 
situation, the receipt of a lump sum and the coverage by occupational or personal 
pension plans.
8 Net income, financial and housing wealth are variables that proxy 
benefit unit’s economic well-being. For the latter two we have information only on 
banded values. Since the survey uses the same nominal bands in both years we adjust 
for inflation the aggregated at benefit unit level midpoints from the 1988/ 89 wave 
and then correspond these to the appropriate 1994 band (more details are provided in 
the Appendix). The housing wealth bands represent gross housing wealth and we have 
included a dummy controlling for mortgage outstanding debts. We also control for 
benefit units that have inherited property since they are endowed with higher initial 
wealth. Information provided by the survey allows us to control for factors that are 
interesting from a behavioural point of view. Specifically, we control for the 
(subjective) views that the benefit units have for the management of their financial 
holdings and their standard of living. Satisfactory management of financial holdings 
                                                 
7 The limited age variability in our sample makes hard the identification of any possible age effects.   
8 Appendix provides details on the derivation of these variables.    6 
usually implies confidence in financial decisions and better knowledge of the 
financial matters, which in turn results to less costly management for the 
informational intensive risky assets. On the other hand, it would be interesting to see 
how the respondents’ view about their standard of living is associated with the 
decision to take higher financial risk (given that the standard of living is closely 
related with some wealth components - such as durables - that are not covered by our 
dummies for housing and financial wealth).  
In Table 1 we present estimated results from probit specifications that model 
the probability of risky asset ownership using the full unbalanced panel of 
observations on benefit units
9. In parentheses we report estimated marginal effects, 
which refer to changes in the ownership probability associated with marginal changes 
in continuous variables (discrete 0-1 changes for dummy variables are assumed) given 
that the remaining variables are held constant at their means. The left side 
specification is a standard probit model applied on the pooled sample of data 
assuming independent observations. By its nature the model neglects individual 
heterogeneity and the possibility that current ownership may be related with past 
ownership. In the right side we present results from a static random effects probit 
model which allows for unobserved heterogeneity. The latter specification allows for 
certain unobserved characteristics to affect in a similar way past and current 
ownership choices. The results from the two models are qualitatively the same, 
however the formal LR test (reported at the bottom of the Table 1) strongly rejects the 
null of zero serial correlation within household and suggests that the panel estimator 
differs from the pooled one.  
                                                 
9 After the exclusion of 155 observations with missing values and severe outliers of net income the 
sample used in the estimation comprise 2,422 benefit units.   7 
The set up of the random effects probit, starting from the latent variable 
specification, is as follows: 
* '    it i it it x y βα =+ + u
                                                
                                            (1) 
where we observe   if   (for those holding risky assets) and   
otherwise.
10 Under the current specification the individual effects ai, that capture the 
unobserved heterogeneity, are treated as random error terms. A rather restrictive 
assumption is that the individual effects a  as well as the idiosyncratic error term u  
are assumed to be independent of the regressors. Both the individual effects and the 
error terms are assumed to follow a normal distribution where   and 
. In addition, the errors are considered to be independent over time.
11 
For model’s estimation we use the Butler and Moffitt (1982) computational algorithm.  
1 it y =
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Results in the right side of Table 1 do not suggest a clear role for age.
12 
Households headed by people with more than standard education have 6% higher 
probabilities in holding risky assets as opposed to the reference category of those with 
basic education. The result is consistent with the view that those with higher 
educational attainment usually enjoy lower informational costs on the management of 
the informational intensive risky assets. Retirement status and the time of retirement 
do not seem to have a significant impact on the relevant decision. On the other hand, 
it is more likely for households that have received a lump sum (either retired or not) to 
 
10 yit
* can be interpreted as the (unobserved) value of the desired level of risky assets for benefit unit i 
at time t.  
11 We can think of ai as representing unobservable-time invariant individual characteristics like risk 
aversion, and uit as a time varying effect, such as individual income innovations or expectation errors 
(see Miniaci and Weber (2002)). At the bottom of Table 1 we report an estimate of  r = sa
2 / (1+sa
2 ) , 
which measures the correlation between the composite latent error ai + ui t across the two waves. This 
can be also viewed as an indicator for the relative importance of the unobserved effect (given that the 
variance of ui  t is set to one by normalization).   
12 Insignificant results were also obtained when we experimented with higher order polynomials. 
Similarly, we did not identify any significant age effects when the same model was estimated for “key 
respondents”.    8 
hold risky assets (the effect is significant at 10%). It may be the case that part of the 
received lump sum is directed to investments in financial assets. Given that 
households receive such a payment at a stage of their lifecycle when they have 
accumulated some wealth in safe assets and they have (or they are about to) paid off 
their mortgage debts it is likely that they will choose to invest money in risky assets 
(taking advantage of the equity premium). In addition, positive and significant effects 
are obtained for those with rights in a private pension plan. This may suggest a 
pension wealth effect, a (wealth) component that is not covered by the other forms of 
wealth that we control for. It may also reveal broader wealth effects, given that the 
underlying level of wealth of those holding private pensions is on average higher. 
Positive effects are also obtained for those with a life insurance policy since this can 
be viewed as an additional asset that provides hedging to some forms of risk that 
households may face. Households classified at higher financial and housing wealth 
bands have significantly higher probabilities in holding risky assets. This positive 
relationship is consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion preferences. 
Furthermore, as higher wealth implies increasingly higher probabilities for risky 
assets’ ownership we can claim  – in contrast to the predictions of the standard pricing 
models - that the portfolios of the wealthier households are not simply scaled – up 
versions of those formed by the poorer (see Guiso et al. (2001)). Households that have 
inherited property have significantly higher probabilities to own risky assets. These 
households have higher initial endowment and they may not incur mortgage debts, 
factors that make more favourable the investment in risky assets.  
The two dummies representing households’ views for the management of their 
financial holdings and the standard of living, although insignificant, display the   9 
expected signs. After controlling for other effects the results suggest a pure time 
effect, namely a 4% increase in risky asset ownership between the years 1988-1994. 
The random effects model of Table 1 was estimated under the restrictive 
assumption of strict exogeneity for all the explanatory variables. However this may 
not be the case for some variables like the financial wealth dummies, given that 
households who chose to invest in risky assets could end up with higher initial wealth 
at the end of the period or the beginning of the next period (see Miniaci and Weber 
(2001)). An immediate way to deal with the potential bias is to estimate a reduced 
form model that does not condition on the financial wealth dummies. Estimated 
results from this reduced form specification are presented in Table 2.  
The results do not suggest noticeable differences in signs as they compared to 
those obtained for the random effects model in Table 1, but some of the RHS 
variables bear the effects from the omitted financial wealth dummies. The most 
pronounced cases are those of retirement status, early retirement, mortgage 
outstanding as well as households’ views for portfolio management and the standard 
of living that turn out now to be significant. As it was expected stronger effects were 
obtained with respect to the net income and housing wealth dummies. 
An interesting finding is that being retired is highly correlated with 
accumulated financial wealth. Indeed, most of the retirees in the sample are people 
that have recently retired (become retired just before 1988 or between 1988 - 1994) 
and therefore they have made investments in financial assets over their working life 
that they have not started to decumulate. From that respect the positive and significant 
result obtained for this dummy is not surprising. In addition, at this stage of the life 
cycle decisions about housing play a central role: many of the retirees may choose to 
downsize their housing wealth and reduce their housing costs. A decision to sell their   10 
house in order to move in a smaller rented accommodation, results in high proceeds 
which will increase their savings and subsequently the probabilities of investing in 
risky assets. As it was expected, those that chose to retire early as a matter of their 
good financial situation have higher probabilities in holding risky assets, while an 
outstanding mortgage seems to discourage investments in risky financial assets. 
Benefit units that declare themselves satisfied with the management of their financial 
holdings may be more informed and / or more experienced in the management of 
risky assets, factors that favour the stock market participation. On the other hand, the 
negative sign obtained for those that do not feel satisfied with their standard of living 
may be indicative for their priority to improve living conditions rather than investing 
in risky financial assets.  
 
 
ii. Fixed Effects Logit Model 
In contrast to the probit model, the logit model lends itself to a fixed effects 
treatment (see Green (2000)). Table 3 shows results from the estimation of a standard 
logit that assumes independent observations (left side specification) and a fixed 
effects logit model (right side specification) using the balanced panel of benefit 
units
13. Results from the conventional logit are qualitatively similar to those presented 
earlier for the standard probit that estimated over the full-unbalanced panel (Table 1).  
The estimation of interest is the fixed effects logit model where we treat   
from (1) as fixed unknown parameters. Any fixed effects model applied on micro-
level panel data suffers from the “incidentals parameter” problem (the number of 
periods T is limited while the sample size N includes thousands of observations).  For 
i a
                                                 
13 The cleaned sample consists  of 1367 benefit units.   11 
fixed T, inconsistent estimators will be produced for  ι α  and this inconsistency will 
carry over to the estimator for  .
14 Unlike the case of the linear models, in the 
nonlinear ones we can not eliminate the 
β
ι α s (individual heterogeneity), by simply 
taking deviations from the group means, such that could be estimated consistently 





                                                
 parameters could not). Chamberlain (1980) has suggested a 
different approach using conditional maximum likelihood. What we maximize is a 
likelihood function which conditions upon a set of statistics t  that are sufficient for 
 (this means that conditional upon   an individual’s likelihood contribution no 
longer depends on a , but still depends on the parameters  ).
15 In contrast to the 
random effects probit, the fixed effects logit produces consistent estimates even if the 
individual effects are correlated with observed variables, allowing the relaxation of a 
rather strong assumption.
16 Its main disadvantage is that benefit units that do not 
change stockownership status over the two periods do not contribute to the likelihood 
function and so have no effect on the estimation. In addition, under a conditional logit 
model many of the effects that we are interested in are not identified (we have to drop 
the time invariant dummies representing gender and educational level as well as the 
year dummy given that it is highly collinear with age
17). Estimating the conditional 
logit model, the sample size reduces dramatically to 292 cases of benefit units that 
change stockownership status in the two periods (equivalently we can estimate an 
i
β
i a i t
 
14 An ai can be estimated consistently only if we have a growing number of observations on i, thus if 
we have T Æ ∞. 
15 Details on the estimation procedure and a complete set of formulas can be found at Verbeek (2000).  
16 The strict exogeneity of observed characteristics xi with respect to ai (required by the random effects 
probit estimation) is may not appealing under the current analysis: given that ai may represent an 
individual characteristic like risk aversion, we implicitly assume that wealth, income, age and 
education are not correlated with risk aversion (see Miniaci and Ruberti (2001)).   
17 As Miniaci and Weber (2001) note: “In fact age and the year dummy are collinear once fixed effects 
are conditioned upon even if no intercept is allowed: age variability is exactly trend like if fixed 
differences across individuals are removed. This highlights the difficulty of identifying age profiles in 
panel data models if time effects are thought to be at play.”    12 
unconditional cross sectional logit with the dependent variable represent 0 to 1 status 
changes and explanatory variables transformed to  ). Estimated results suggest 
the same pattern of coefficients on financial wealth, inherited property and private 
pension coverage as they compared to those from the standard logit. However, a 
formal Hausman test, reported at the bottom of Table 3 suggests that there are 
significant differences between the conventional logit and the fixed effects model and 
that heterogeneity matters.
18 According to the test the relevant results are those from 
fixed effects logit: the effects of net income and housing wealth mainly due to the 
limited variation in the banded housing values, were hard to identify. Overall, the 
estimates that allow for fixed effects do not seem to be seriously affected when 
financial wealth is treated as endogenous.  
2 i xx − 1 i
                                                
 
 
iii. Further Issues 
Specifications presented in Tables 1,  2  and  3 condition on various 
demographic and relevant to pension status variables defined over the household 
head. We have estimated similar models controlling in addition for the characteristics 
of spouses. Our results were not affected and dummies on spouses’ characteristics 
were not found to have any significant explanatory power. Since most of these 
characteristics are similar to those of the heads living under the same household their 
inclusion in the RHS variables would inflate the standard errors.   
 
) −
18 We cannot test this hypothesis on the basis of a LR test since the two likelihoods (due to the different 
number of observations in the two models) are not comparable. For details on the particular Hausman 
test see Green (2000). The chi-squared statistic is calculated as: 
c
2  =  ()   
^^ ^^
1 ' [ [ ] [ ] ] ( CML ML CML ML Var CML Var ML ββ ββ
− −−  13 
Apart from the above models, we have estimated standard probit regressions 
modelling the ownership probability of owning risky assets in each of the two waves. 
Results from this cross sectional analysis are broadly similar to those presented earlier 
and they are not reported.  
However, the data that we have used in both cross sectional and panel analysis 
have two limitations:  
The first is that financial and housing wealth, two important factors in 
exploring household portfolio choices, are given in broad bands. A possible solution 
would be the estimation of a grouped dependent variable estimator (GDV) in order to 
derive predicted values on these two variables (Stewart (1983)). Nevertheless, many 
of the variables that can be used as explanatory in GDV regressions are variables of 
special interest that are also used in the probit specifications. As an experiment we 
estimated GDV models obtaining predicted values on financial and housing wealth 
for 1994. In the first case interest earnings was the only regressor while in the second 
one a set of dummies representing the reported council tax bands (an information that 
unfortunately is available only for 1994) was used. The predicted values replaced the 
financial and housing wealth band dummies in 1994 static probit specifications 
without suggesting noticeable changes in the estimated results. 
The second one is that the availability of a two-wave panel does not allow us 
to explore the dynamic nature of portfolio decisions over time. An interesting research 
question to address is the extent that the risky asset ownership at previous periods 
affects stockholding decisions at the current period. If current ownership does depend 
in a direct way upon past ownership (for instance due to considerable fixed entry costs 
and / or cumulated experience in financial management) then we have to deal with   14 
what Heckman (1978) terms as true state dependence
19. In this case the specification 
given by (1) can be modified to include an extra term γ  allowing for dependency 
between the current desired level of risky assets and actual ownership status one 
period before. If there is no true state dependence then γ should not differ 
significantly from zero. In the recent years there is a development of various dynamic 
panel data models that can be used in cases that we allow for true state dependence 
and/ or   from (1) are serially correlated.
20 




4. Transition Rates 
In this section we estimate various risky asset ownership and transition rates 
(for a similar analysis see Hurd (2001)). Table 4 gives a summary for the ownership 
status of the eligible individuals that interviewed in both survey years. The steady rate 
of risky asset ownership that would occur in the long run if the observed transition 


















                                                 
19 The experience of an event by an individual affects his preferences, constraints, etc. in a way that he 
is more likely to experience that event in the future. 
20 For an overview in dynamic panel data models see Verbeek (2000) and Miniaci and Weber (2001). 
For an application in household portfolio models see Hochguertel (2001).     15 
where  and   are the transition probabilities from not owning risky assets in 1988 
to not owning in 1994, and from owning in 1988 to owning in 1994 respectively.
21 
The number of those that owned risky assets in 1988 and do not own in 1994 (187) as 
a proportion of all the 1988 owners (596) is 31%, much higher from the proportion of 
those that did not own in 1988 and become owners in 1994 (247/ 1376 =19%). 
However, the overall rate of risky assets owners in 1994 (33%) has increased relative 
to the one in 1988 (30%) since more people changed status from non ownership to 
ownership than the reverse. The computed steady state is 36.3% (32.8 % for risky 
assets that comprise only Stocks, Shares and Bonds), not too far away from the rates 
that are observed today. 
00 P 11 P
In addition we derive an estimated measure for the steady state rate after 
controlling for some basic individual characteristics. First we estimate two logit 
specifications (results are presented in Table 5) that model the ownership probability 
of owning risky assets in 1994 for the sub-sample of those that do not own in 1988 
(left-side) as well as the probability of owning risky assets for those that own in 1988 
(right side). The explanatory variables in these two simple models exhibit the 
expected signs. Individuals with higher financial and housing wealth levels that were 
not owners in 1988, have higher probabilities in becoming owners in 1994. On the 
other hand, less evident wealth effects are obtained with respect to the probabilities of 
holding risky assets in 1994 for those that were owners in 1988. This may suggest the 
importance of fixed entry costs in the stock market. (Any remaining positive 
association of wealth with 1994 ownership in the second equation is consistent with 
considerable monitoring and management costs.) For each of the two models we have 
                                                 
21 This gives a partial view on the mobility of risky assets since we explore transitions for people that 
sell all their risky assets or decide to add (at least one) in a riskless portfolio. We do not observe any 
changes in the number or share of risky assets over time.   16 
calculated mean predicted probabilities (reported at the bottom of Table 5). These 
correspond to mean predicted ownership rates which can be used in the above formula 
to calculate a steady state rate. The estimated steady state as this derives from the 
mean predicted probabilities of the above two models is 32%. However, the samples 
used in the estimation of the two logit specifications include - by construction - 
observations on different individuals and thus we can use a slightly different approach 
to derive an estimated steady state. We obtain predicted probabilities from each of the 
two models and subsequently calculate steady state rates by assuming an individual 
(in 1988) with composite median characteristics
22. In Table 6 we present estimated 
steady states for this “typical” individual at different financial and housing wealth 
levels, by holding the remaining characteristics constant at their medians. The steady 
state rates are increased - almost uniformly - along higher financial and housing 
wealth levels in line with portfolio theory predictions that wealthier people should 
hold a greater share of risky assets if their preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. More evident is the increase associated with higher financial wealth levels 
stressing the relative importance of the accumulated financial wealth.      
 
 
5. Bivariate Probit model 
i. Model specification and estimated results 
Our analysis in this section mainly follows the methodology proposed by 
Bertaut (1996) who explores the stockholding behaviour of US households utilizing 
                                                 
22 The assumed characteristics are: 62 years old, female, married, has children, less than high school 
education, no reported health problems, retired, log (net income): 4.29, without a mortgage 
outstanding.   17 
panel data from the SCF. Our results for the elderly participating in the Retirement 
Survey are highly comparable to those she presents.  
What we observe in each of the two waves is the risky asset ownership 
decision D of an individual i. If  Di =1 (the individual holds risky assets) then the 
probability  , where   is a set of observed individual-specific 
characteristics and u  are normally distributed, can be estimated by a standard probit 
model. Since we utilize data from a two-wave balanced panel, we can estimate a 
bivariate specification that models the probability of owning risky assets in each year 
by allowing for correlation r between the disturbances   of each individual. This is 
a way to control for unobserved heterogeneity given that u  can be decomposed to an 
individual-specific, time invariant unobserved characteristic   and a time varying 
effect 
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If the errors are jointly normally distributed, risky asset ownership probabilities for 
1988 and 1994 can be estimated by a bivariate probit model. The variance of u ,  
, is normalized to one because only the ratio of  b/s can be identified by probit 
maximum likelihood.
23 Under the null hypothesis that r equals to zero, the model 
consists of two probit equations, which can be estimated separately assuming 




23 For a full set of formulas see Green (2000).   18 
the current specification does not restrict the estimated coefficients to be equal in both 
the ownership decisions made in 1988 and 1994. 
Table 4 summarizes information on risky asset ownership decisions of 
individuals who hold risky financial assets in both periods, those who do not invest in 
risky assets, as well as those who change status.  
The bivariate probit that we estimate allows us to calculate predicted 
probabilities on each of the above ownership categories and in addition to derive 
conditional probabilities of continued ownership or non-ownership.  
As in the previous specifications various demographic factors like age, gender, 
educational level are included in the part of explanatory variables. The use of a panel 
and the distinction of the risky asset ownership decisions into two, static, but related 
through unobserved heterogeneity, choices allows controlling for the impact of life-
cycle changes that took place in the particular period.
24 Namely, we control for 
changes in the marital status - an important life-cycle factor for individuals’ 
economic situation and consequently their financial decisions. (In particular we 
distinguish among those stayed married to the same spouse in 1994, those who 
became married between the two interview periods and those who were divorced; 
with those who stayed single being the omitted group.) More importantly, as a key 
feature of our sample is the change in the retirement status that many of the 
individuals experienced between the two periods, we include dummies representing 
those being retired in 1988, remaining retired in 1994 or become retired in 1994. 
Furthermore, individuals who had received a lump sum in 1994 are distinguished to 
those who had received the lump sum before and after 1988. We also control for 
respondents’ well-being by the means of net income, banded housing wealth and 
                                                 
24 Since the two dependent  variables do not depend on the same list of explanatory variables what we 
actually estimate is a seemingly unrelated two equation probit specification.   19 
median financial wealth
25. Finally, we control for two potentially important factors. 
The one has to do with those - few - individuals who bought a house since the 1988 
interview, given that such an important financial decision usually implies broader 
portfolio reallocations. The other is a dummy included in the 1994 controlling for 
potential credit difficulties that some individuals may face (the relevant information 
was not available for 1988 – see the appendix for more details).   
Estimated results from the bivariate probit specification are presented in Table 
7. The estimate of r, the correlation between the individual specific error terms, is 
0.52 and the null hypothesis that individuals’ risky asset ownership decisions at these 
two different time periods are not influenced by unobserved heterogeneity is strongly 
rejected by both a Wald (reported at the bottom of Table 7) and a Likelihood Ratio 
(c
2(1)= 158.9) test. 
Age does not have any significant effect in both equations (higher order age 
factors were insignificant as well). Being married in 1988 and staying married to the 
same spouse in 1994 seem to have a positive - and similar in magnitude - effect on 
the stockownership decision in these years. Our results do not suggest any significant 
role for the 1988 retirement status as well as for retirement status changes observed in 
1994.
26 Having received a lump sum increases the stock ownership probability in the 
1988 equation. Similar results are obtained in the 1994 but only for those that had 
received their lump sum prior to 1988. A possible explanation offers the fact that the 
                                                 
25 “Median financial wealth” is a categorical variable constructed from the mid points of the nominal 
financial wealth bands that individuals report.  When we estimated the same model including dummies 
representing financial wealth bands (as in the previous specifications) the model took more than 100 
iterations to converge, nevertheless the results were broadly the same to those - from the more stable 
specification - that we present in Table 7. 
26 This was similarly the case for variables that were used in earlier specifications but which have been 
excluded from the current one. Dummies representing occupational or personal pension coverage and 
rights in an insurance policy, were not found to have any individual or joint - from both equations - 
explanatory power.   20 
financial environment in the mid-eighties (privatisation of large nationalized 
industries and extensive advertisement of their issued shares) encouraged the 
investment of any lump sum earnings in stocks.  This may also reveal that the 
decision to invest money received from a lump sum in the stock market is not an 
immediate one. Results from another specification stress the importance of the 
informational advantages (that individuals with more than standard education are 
supposed to enjoy) on the stock ownership decisions. Individuals reporting health 
problems have lower probabilities in holding risky assets in 1994 (the result is 
insignificant in the 1988 equation) suggesting possibly that persistent health problems 
at a higher age increase the mortality risk, inducing a more conservative portfolio 
behaviour.  
Net income, median financial wealth and banded housing wealth are strongly 
associated with higher stock ownership probabilities in both waves (the effects are of 
similar magnitude in both years). Dummies representing individuals who have 
inherited property and systematically overdrew money display the expected signs 
(although the last is insignificant). A clear-cut result is not obtained for the case of 
those that bought a new house within the interview periods, nevertheless the negative 
sign is may be suggestive for the impact of large housing expenditures on the relevant 
decision. The positive effect in 1994 equation for those with a mortgage outstanding 
seems puzzling, but the fact that some of them decided to buy a risky asset as they are 
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ii. Predicted probabilities of risky asset ownership 
Based on the estimated bivariate probit of Table 7 we have calculated 
predicted probabilities for each of the four alternative risky asset ownership 
categories. We consider the cases of three hypothetical individuals with their 
composite characteristics fixed at sample’s 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles (they 
summarized by Table 8).  
Predicted probabilities for each of the four risky asset ownership alternatives 
are presented in Graph 1 with regard to the three hypothetical individuals. The first 
set of bars presents the probability of not holding risky assets in both interview years. 
The next two sets of bars show the probability of not holding risky assets in 1988 but 
hold in 1994, and hold in 1988 but not hold in 1994. The final set of bars shows the 
probability of investing in risky assets both years. Differences in predicted 
probabilities for the three hypothetical individuals are evident in any state and they 
are mainly associated with the assumed differences in financial, housing wealth, net 
income and educational level. Individuals with characteristics at 25
th percentile have 
extremely high probabilities - about 90% - to abstain from any investment in risky 
assets both interview years. The probabilities of holding risky assets in any of the two 
waves is very small and the probability of holding risky assets in both years is just 
2%. On the other hand, individuals with characteristics at 75
th percentile have higher 
probabilities (compared to those obtained for other states) to be risky asset owners in 
both years. The probabilities for these individuals not to hold risky assets does not 
exceed the 25% while the predicted probabilities for holding risky assets in 1988 and 
not holding in 1994 are very low (10%). Intermediate probabilities are obtained for 
those with median characteristics following the tendency observed in the other two   22 
cases. Not investing in risky assets in both years has the highest predicted probability 
(64%) for median individuals.  
In addition to the above probabilities for the risky asset ownership status we 
have also calculated conditional probabilities estimating how likely is for a 1988 risky 
asset holder/ non-holder to continue to be a holder/ non-holder in 1994. Conditional 

















where   is derived from the univariate normal c.d.f. of the 1988 
equation.  
1 Prob( ) i Yy = 1
Graph 2 that summarizes conditional probabilities, consists of two diagrams: 
In the left side one, the two set of bars show the conditional probabilities that non-
owners in 1988 will continue to abstain from any risky asset investments, or enter the 
risky asset market between the interview periods. The two bar sets in the right 
diagram present the probability that 1988 risky asset owners will choose to leave the 
market until 1994 or they will continue to own risky assets.  
An important result, by comparing the second set of bars from both diagrams 
is that individuals (of any type) appear to have much higher probabilities in holding 
risky assets in 1994 if they were owners in 1988 rather than if they were not. In other 
words, individuals that had incurred prior to 1988 the fixed entry costs associated with 
risky financial assets’ ownership (interpreted as “participation fees” or “informational 
requirements”) are more likely to continue to hold risky assets relative to the 1994 
holders that they did not own in 1988 and they had to pay an extra participation fee. 
The probability for a median individual of remaining an owner is 50%, much higher 
from the estimated one that an individual with the same characteristics that did not   23 
own in 1988 would add a risky asset in his portfolio in the meantime (17%). Given 
that these differences in probabilities are disproportional for the less well off we may 
infer that such fixed costs have greater importance for those with lower wealth. Thus, 
entry costs seem to play the dominant role in portfolio formation with those that 
already participate to have higher probabilities to stay into the market, even though 
they have to afford considerable monitoring costs each period. The fact that a median 
risky asset holder in 1988 has about the same probabilities (50%) to continue to hold 
or no longer hold risky assets in 1994 stresses the relative importance of the 
monitoring and management costs.  
A second issue has to do with the inertial behaviour which seems to be an 
important factor for households’ portfolio formation. The predicted probability that a 
median non-owner in 1988 will not hold risky assets in 1994 is very high, exceeding 
the 80%. Similarly, the probability of the median risky asset owner in 1988 to 
continue to participate in 1994 is high, reaching the 50%. In the case of those with 
characteristics at the 25
th percentile the probability of abstaining from the stock 
market is about 95%, while for the very few that held risky assets from 1988, the 
combination of the relative low financial, housing wealth, income and education, 
lower the probability of participating in both years to 30%. However, a non owner of 
risky assets in 1988 with characteristics at 75
th percentile has about the same 
probabilities of becoming an owner in 1994 or remaining a non owner. Thus, 
wealthier individuals seem to have a strong incentive to overcome inertial behaviour 
and eventually get into the market (see Bertaut (1996)).  
Graph 3 shows the effects on the stockownership conditional probabilities for 
the median individual assuming changes only in his financial wealth, while Graphs 4 
and 5 assume changes only in housing wealth and educational level respectively.    24 
These graphs reveal pictures similar to those obtained by the general Graph 2. 
The most evident changes in predicted probabilities for a median individual result 
from the assumed differences in the levels of financial wealth. Greater financial 
wealth increases the probability for a non owner in 1988 to be an owner in 1994 while 
reduces the probability that an owner in 1988 will leave the market by 1994. Along 
higher financial wealth levels, it is more likely for an otherwise “typical” risky asset 
owner in 1988 to continue to hold risky assets in 1994 rather than change status.  
Finally, for a value of rho close to zero the ownership decisions in the two 
years should be independent (in a behavioural, not necessarily statistical sense). 
Indeed Graph 6 suggests that the probabilities of not owning (or owning) in 94 are the 
same, unaffected from the ownership status in 1988. On the other hand, the higher the 
correlation between the individual disturbances (higher values of rho), the higher the 
relative importance of the unobserved heterogeneity which seems to result in higher 




Our study utilized panel data from the Retirement Survey in order to explore 
risky assets ownership decisions made by the elderly. Our results provide some 
insights for various aspects of portfolio behaviour for the older part of the UK 
population over the period 1988-94. In line with similar studies’ findings from other 
countries, financial, housing wealth and net income were identified as important 
determinants in the ownership choices. The nature of the dataset enabled us to explore 
the impact of various factors (like the rights on pension schemes, the timing of 
retirement and the receipt of a lump sum) on the portfolio behaviour of the elderly.   25 
All specifications suggest a significant role for the educational attainment, an indirect 
evidence for the importance of the informational advantages that these households 
enjoy. This result is interesting bearing in mind that differences in education tend to 
be eliminated by the experience in financial management that older households have 
naturally gained over time. Predicted probabilities from the bivariate probit analysis 
made strong suggestions for the role of fixed entry costs and inertial behaviour in 
risky asset ownership decisions. In line with our expectations such fixed costs seem to 
be more important for the less well off. The availability of one more wave and data on 
asset amounts are essential for the extension of this research and a more thorough 
analysis.   
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Table 1: Ownership of Risky Financial Assets: Probit Models 
                                               
                              ML  Pooled                          ML Random Effects     
Number of Observations/ Benefit Units:  3789 / 2422     
Log Likelihood                                        -1633.25                                        -1579.01     
Pseudo R




 coefficient    t-value on  (marginal 
   estimate     coefficient       effect)   
 
 coefficient    t-value on  (marginal 
   estimate     coefficient       effect)    
Age -0.0026  -0.41  (-0.001) -0.0030  -0.32  (-0.001) 
Male 0.0148  0.16  (0.004) 0.0728  0.51  (0.014) 
Married   -0.1522  -1.80  (-0.044) -0.2321  -1.77  (-0.048) 
Has children  0.0779  1.12  (0.022) 0.1038  0.94  (0.019) 
More than 16 year old when  
finished full time education 
0.1727  2.89  (0.051) 0.2935  3.02  (0.063) 
Reported Health Problems  -0.0109  -0.17  (-0.003) 0.0009   0.01  (0.000) 
Retired 0.0586  0.76  (0.017) 0.0490  0.43  (0.009) 
Has retired late  0.2177  1.60  (0.067) 0.1873  0.98  (0.041) 
Has retired early  0.0621  0.84  (0.018) 0.0716  0.67  (0.015) 
Has received lump sum  0.1127  1.77  (0.032) 0.1729  1.79  (0.034) 
Has occupational pension  -0.0058  -0.10  (-0.002) 0.0035  0.03  (0.001) 
Has private pension  0.2621  2.86  (0.081) 0.4071  2.87  (0.097) 
Has insurance policy  0.1769  2.54  (0.053) 0.2033  2.05  (0.044) 
log(Net Income)  0.2040  3.53  (0.058) 0.2847  3.36  (0.057) 
Financial Wealth £1-3,000  1.6102  6.26  (0.549) 2.1999  6.40  (0.658) 
Financial Wealth £3-6,000  1.9156  7.42  (0.657) 2.6302  7.53  (0.799) 
Financial Wealth £6-8,000  1.9707  7.11  (0.674) 2.7745  7.29  (0.833) 
Financial Wealth £8-10,000  2.0774  7.68  (0.698) 2.8524  7.77  (0.844) 
Financial Wealth £10-20,000  2.5413  9.76  (0.789) 3.4663  9.63  (0.912) 
Financial Wealth £20-30,000  2.4262  9.10  (0.761) 3.3942  9.13  (0.895) 
Financial Wealth over £30,000  2.7471  10.56  (0.830) 3.7680  10.31  (0.940) 
Housing Wealth £1-25,000  0.1253  0.80  (0.037) 0.1469  0.65  (0.032) 
Housing Wealth £25-50,000  0.1068  0.93  (0.032) 0.1976  1.19  (0.043) 
Housing Wealth £50-100,000   0.3325  4.31  (0.101) 0.4947  4.17  (0.114) 
Housing Wealth £100-150,000  0.3650  4.33  (0.113) 0.5074  3.99  (0.121) 
Housing Wealth £150-200,000  0.5035  4.51  (0.166) 0.6650  4.04  (0.177) 
Housing Wealth over £200,000  0.5347  4.15  (0.178) 0.7195  3.73  (0.197) 
Mortgage Outstanding  0.0419  0.55  (0.012) 0.0653  0.57  (0.013) 
Has inherited property  0.3284  5.43  (0.100) 0.5076  5.17  (0.101) 
Satisfied with the management 
of financial holdings 
0.0783  1.26  (0.022) 0.1306  1.45  (0.026) 
Dissatisfied with the standard of 
living 
-0.0349  -0.34  (-0.010) -0.1152  -0.75  (-0.023) 
Year 1994  0.1596  2.38  (0.046) 0.2036  2.19  (0.042) 
Live in London  0.0836  1.00  (0.024) 0.1129  0.85  (0.024) 
Constant -5.0521  -7.58   -5.7223  -7.00   
LRT Ho: r=0 (c
2(1))                               108.50        (r : 0.532   (s.e.  .043)) 
 
Note: The sample uses the full unbalanced panel of the benefit units. “Risky financial assets” comprise Stocks, 
Shares, Bonds, Debentures, Unit Trusts, Gilt Edged Stocks and Local Authority Securities. Explanatory variables 
are defined over the head except net income, financial and housing wealth. Wealth and income variables have 
been deflated using the CPI and are expressed in constant 1994 prices. Marginal effects in parentheses refer to 
change in the ownership probability associated with marginal changes in continuous variables (change in dummy 





Table 2: Ownership of Risky Financial Assets: Random Effects Probit Model 
   
ML Random Effects 
 
 
Number of Observations/ Benefit Units     3789 / 2422       
Log Likelihood                                             -1774.16 
Pseudo R
2                                                       0.190   
Explanatory Variable 
 
         coefficient        t-value on      (marginal 
         estimate         coefficient           effect)  
Age -0.0038  -0.41  (-0.001) 
Male 0.1015  0.75  (0.027) 
Married   -0.2610  -2.09  (-0.072) 
Has children  -0.1146  -1.07  (-0.032) 
More than 16 year old when  
finished full time education 
0.3693  3.88  (0.106) 
Reported Health Problems  -0.1320  -1.41  (-0.035) 
Retired 0.2801  2.66  (0.071) 
Has retired late  0.1715  0.94  (0.049) 
Has retired early  0.2208  2.13  (0.063) 
Has received lump sum  0.2530  2.76  (0.066) 
Has occupational pension  0.0392  0.40  (0.011) 
Has private pension  0.4786  3.44  (0.149) 
Has insurance policy  0.3272  3.42  (0.096) 
log(Net Income)  0.6157  7.53  (0.165) 
Housing Wealth £1-25,000  0.2675  1.26  (0.079) 
Housing Wealth £25-50,000  0.4323  2.72  (0.134) 
Housing Wealth £50-100,000  0.8552  7.43  (0.268) 
Housing Wealth £100-150,000  0.9079  7.30  (0.295) 
Housing Wealth £150-200,000  1.0026  6.28  (0.348) 
Housing Wealth over £200,000  1.1954  6.35  (0.424) 
Mortgage Outstanding  -0.2095  -1.95  (-0.052) 
Has inherited property  0.6593  6.72  (0.176) 
Satisfied with the management 
of financial holdings 
0.4226  4.98  (0.113) 
Dissatisfied with the standard of  
living 
-0.3141  -2.22  (-0.084) 
Year 1994  0.2280  2.58  (0.062) 
Live in London  0.1815  1.40  (0.052) 
Constant -5.1012  -7.19 
LRT Ho: r=0 (c
2(1))                 142.7        (r : 0.554   (s.e.  .038)) 
 
Note: The sample uses the full unbalanced panel of the benefit units. “Risky financial 
assets” comprise Stocks, Shares, Bonds, Debentures, Unit Trusts, Gilt Edged Stocks and 
Local Authority Securities. Explanatory variables are defined over the head except net 
income, financial and housing wealth. Wealth and income variables have been deflated 
using the CPI and are expressed in constant 1994 prices. Marginal effects in parentheses 
refer to changes in the ownership probability associated with marginal changes in 
continuous variables (change in dummy variables from 0 to 1 is assumed). 
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Table 3 : Ownership of Risky Financial Assets: Logit Models 
                                               
                             ML  Pooled                         Fixed  Effects     
Number of Observations/ Benefit Units:      2734 / 1367    584 / 292 
Log Likelihood                                                -1238.5                                           -154.4 
Pseudo R




      coefficient        t-value on   
        estimate         coefficient    
 
  coefficient      t-value on   
     estimate       coefficient        
Age -0.0065  -0.52  0.0031  0.07 
Male -0.0498  -0.29  -  - 
Married   -0.2193  -1.30  -0.9807  -1.29 
Has children  0.2581  1.81  0.5914  0.46 
More than 16 year old when  
finished full time education 
0.2211  1.94  -  - 
Reported Health Problems  -0.0274  -0.20  0.5131  1.21 
Retired 0.0865  0.57  -0.2609  -0.72 
Has retired late  0.3554  1.44  -0.2670  -0.50 
Has retired early  0.1109  0.79  -0.1716  -0.51 
Has received lump sum  0.2629  2.07  0.4857  1.10 
Has occupational pension  -0.0358  -0.27  -0.7687  -0.98 
Has private pension  0.5296  2.90  2.2858  2.44 
Has insurance policy  0.2285  1.63  -0.3326  -1.09 
log(Net Income)  0.2493  2.13  0.0872  0.33 
Financial Wealth £1-3,000  3.3628  4.66  2.4276  2.97 
Financial Wealth £3-6,000  3.9481  5.46  3.1295  3.71 
Financial Wealth £6-8,000  4.1893  5.57  4.1980  4.22 
Financial Wealth £8-10,000  4.1378  5.61  3.2382  3.64 
Financial Wealth £10-20,000  5.0538  6.98  3.9690  4.59 
Financial Wealth £20-30,000  4.8476  6.61  4.0736  4.47 
Financial Wealth over £30,000  5.3439  7.37  4.1742  4.68 
Housing Wealth £1-25,000  0.2196  0.65  -0.1915  -0.26 
Housing Wealth £25-50,000  0.2562  1.22  0.2344  0.34 
Housing Wealth £50-100,000  0.6115  3.98  0.2732  0.42 
Housing Wealth £100-150,000  0.6354  3.66  -0.0607  -0.09 
Housing Wealth £150-200,000  1.0164  4.32  -0.1666  -0.22 
Housing Wealth over £200,000  1.1367  4.25  -0.6856  -0.75 
Mortgage Outstanding  0.0331  0.23  0.2932  0.69 
Has inherited property  0.4626  3.98  1.7655  2.50 
Satisfied with the management 
of financial holdings 
0.1784  1.44  0.1156  0.40 
Dissatisfied with the standard of  
living 
-0.0367  -0.17  -0.7937  -1.60 
Year 1994  0.2248  1.67  -  - 
Live in London  0.2169  1.30  -1.7495  -1.14 
Constant -6.9828  -5.87  -  - 
Hausman Ho: r=0 (c
2(30))                   78.96     (p-value: 0.00) 
 
Note: The sample uses the balanced panel of the benefit units. “Risky financial assets” comprise 
Stocks, Shares, Bonds, Debentures, Unit Trusts, Gilt Edged Stocks and Local Authority Securities. 
Explanatory variables are defined over the head except net income, financial and housing wealth. 
Wealth and income variables have been deflated using the CPI and are expressed in constant 1994 
prices.  











                
 
Table 4 : Risky Asset Ownership in 1988 and 1994 
            Risky asset ownership in 1994   
Risky asset 
ownership in 1988  No Yes  Total 
         No  1129  247  1376  
        Yes  187  409  596  
     Total  1316  656  1972 
 
















































Table 5: Logistic Estimation of Transition Probabilities 
                                                Not own in 1988 to own in 1994  Own in 1988 to own in 1994 
Number of Observations (“key respondents”)     1376               596 
Log Likelihood                                                       -554.1                            -337.3                    
Pseudo R




     coefficient      t-value on 
      estimate        coefficient     
 
 coefficient        t-value on   
   estimate         coefficient    
Age -0.0665  -2.77  0.0285  1.04 
Male 0.0164  0.09  0.2238  0.99 
Married   0.2219  1.03  -0.0357  -0.13 
Has children  0.1797  0.72  -0.0135  -0.05 
More than 16 year old when  
finished full time education 
0.3239  1.86  0.4497  2.16 
Reported Health Problems  -0.7060  -2.84  0.0099  0.03 
Retired 0.2313  1.13  -0.2451  -1.00 
log(Net Income)  0.1498  1.56  -0.0684  -0.60 
Financial Wealth £1-3,000  0.1217  0.58  -  - 
Financial Wealth £3-6,000  0.2539  0.82  0.3198  1.16 
Financial Wealth £6-8,000  1.0784  2.97  0.4389  1.11 
Financial Wealth £8-10,000  0.6610  1.85  0.2105  0.54 
Financial Wealth £10-20,000  0.4908  1.55  0.4314  1.44 
Financial Wealth £20-30,000  0.9904  2.44  0.5053  1.33 
Financial Wealth over £30,000  0.8707  2.08  1.5262  4.17 
Housing Wealth £1-25,000  1.0775  3.95  0.1528  0.40 
Housing Wealth £25-50,000  1.2359  4.80  0.4449  1.33 
Housing Wealth £50-100,000  1.7253  6.67  0.9599  2.68 
Housing Wealth £100-150,000  1.8294  4.55  0.4427  1.02 
Housing Wealth over £150,000  1.6332  3.40  1.4401  2.50 
Mortgage Outstanding  0.1439  0.74  -0.1886  -0.74 
Constant 0.2010  0.13  -1.7606  -1.04 
Mean predicted probability  0.135 0.713 
 
Note: The sample uses the balanced panel of the “key respondents” (aged 55-69 in 1988) and the 
explanatory variables refer to the 1988 wave. “Risky financial assets” comprise Stocks, Shares, 
Bonds, Debentures, Unit Trusts, Gilt Edged Stocks and Local Authority Securities. The t statistics 




















  Table 6: Predicted Steady State rates for median individual 
Financial Wealth £1-3,000  0.248 
Financial Wealth £3-6,000  0.301 
Financial Wealth £6-8,000*  0.456 
Financial Wealth £8-10,000*  0.358 
Financial Wealth £10-20,000  0.355 
Financial Wealth £20-30,000*  0.450 




   
  Housing Wealth £0- 25,000*  0.237 
  Housing Wealth £25,000 – 50,000*  0.287 
  Housing Wealth £50,000 – 100,000*  0.432 
  Housing Wealth £100,000 – 150,000*  0.385 










































Table 7 : Ownership of Risky Financial Assets:  Bivariate Probit Model 
   
             1988 equation 
 
        1994 equation 
Number of Observations (“key respondents”)        1972   
Log Likelihood                                                          -1781.6 
 
Explanatory Variable 
   
   coefficient 
    estimate 
 
 t-value on 
 coefficient 
  
  coefficient 




Age   -0.0096  -0.96  -0.0031  -0.32 
Male 0.0054  0.07  0.0127  0.15 
Married in 1988   0.1683  1.87  -  - 
Stay married   -  -  0.1062  1.17 
Married between 1988-94  -  -  -0.8202  -1.81 
Divorced/ Widowed  -  -  0.0032  0.05 
Has children  -0.0150  -0.15  0.1684  1.64 
More than 16 year old when  
finished full time education 
0.1873  2.44  0.1664  2.13       
 
Reported Health Problems  -0.1148  -1.31  -0.1662  -1.99 
Retired in 1988  0.0608  0.69  -  - 
Remained Retired in 1994  -  -   0.0311  0.26 
Became Retired in 1994  -  -  -0.0845  -0.78 
Has received lump sum in 1988  0.1390  1.96  -  - 
Has received lump sum before 1988  -  -   0.1669  2.14 
Has received lump sum between 1988-94  -  -  0.0507  0.46 
log(Net Income)  0.0784  2.06  0.0952  1.96 
Median Financial Wealth * 10
-4 0.4650  11.49  0.4890  13.76 
Housing Wealth £1-25,000  0.3947  3.58  0.0160  0.11 
Housing Wealth £25-50,000  0.5847  5.98  0.4937  5.10 
Housing Wealth £50-100,000  0.5783  5.45  0.5523  5.17 
Housing Wealth £100-150,000  0.6902  3.90  0.4994  2.88 
Housing Wealth over £150,000  0.7442  3.66  0.7995  3.64 
Bought house between 1988-94  -  -  -0.2692  -1.49 
Has inherited property   0.3571  4.34  0.1847  2.38 
Mortgage Outstanding  -0.0359  -0.42  0.2525  2.28 
Overdrew money in 1994  -  -  -0.2327    -1.04 
Constant -1.3641  -2.24  -1.9353  -2.72 
 r            0.5225  (s.e..036)   
Wald Test Ho: r=0 (c
2(1))                                          135.1   
 
Note: The sample uses the balanced panel of the “key respondents” (aged 55-69 in 1988). “Risky 
financial assets” comprise Stocks, Shares, Bonds, Debentures, Unit Trusts, Gilt Edged Stocks and Local 
Authority Securities. The t statistics have been computed using standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity assuming independence of observations across different individuals but not necessarily 



















        25
th  Percentile 
                                               
            Median            75
th  Percentile 
Age  (1988)  58 62 65 
Male No  No  Yes 
Married in 1988   No  Yes             Yes 
Stay married   No  Yes  Yes 
Married between 1988-94  No  No  No 
Divorced/  Widowed  No No No 
Has  Children  Yes Yes Yes 
More than 16 year old when  
finished full time education  No No  Yes 
Reported Health Problems (1988)  No  No  No 
Reported Health Problems (1994)  No  No  No 
Retired in 1988  No  Yes  Yes 
Remained Retired in 1994  No  Yes  Yes 
Became Retired in 1994  No  No  No 
Has received lump sum in 1988  No  No  Yes 
Has received lump sum before 1988  No  No  Yes 
Has received lump sum between 1988-94  No  No  No 
log(Net Income) (1988)  3.78  4.29  4.87 
log(Net Income) (1994)  4.17  4.61  5.12 
Median Financial Wealth  (1988)  1,500  1,500  9,000 
Median Financial Wealth  (1994)  1,500  4,500  15,000 
Housing Wealth (1988)  0  25-50,000  50-100,000 
Housing Wealth (1994)  0  25-50,000   50-100,000 
Bought house between 1988-94  No  No  No 
Has inherited property (1988)  No   No  No 
Has inherited property (1994)  No  No  Yes 
Mortgage Outstanding (1988)  No   No  No 
Mortgage Outstanding (1994)  No   No  No 




































Predicted Ownership Status for Risky Assets  

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effects from Financial Wealth changes on Conditional Probabilities 
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Graph 4 
Effects from Housing Wealth changes on Conditional Probabilities 
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Effects from differences in Educational Level on Conditional Probabilities 
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Effects from differences in rho on Conditional Probabilities 










































￿  rho tends to 1








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿  rho tends to 1
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i) Each individual is asked to assign the total amount of his financial wealth at one of 
the following nominal bands: £1-3,000, £3,000-6,000, £6,000-8,000, £8,000-10,000, 
£10,000-20,000, £20,000-30,000 and more than £30,000. The midpoints
27 from these 
bands in each of the two waves (midpoints from 1988 have been adjusted for inflation 
and expressed in 1994 constant prices) are aggregated at a benefit unit level producing 
two values (one per survey year) for each benefit unit that are re-assigned in one of 
these bands. The models that  based on samples with “key respondents” do not require 
any inflation adjustment and we can simply consider a categorical variable 
representing midpoints or dummies representing the nominal bands. In the case of 
housing wealth, each benefit unit assigns the value of the house that owns in one of 
the nominal bands: £1-25,000, £25,000-50,000, £50,000-100,000, £100,000-150,000 
and more than £150,000. In the cases where estimation involves “key respondents” 
we assume that housing wealth is equally shared between the two members of a 
couple (the midpoint of the housing wealth band is then divided by two and it is re-
assigned in the appropriate band).  
 
ii) Benefit units that gave an affirmative answer in the following question they are 
considered that they have inherited property. 
“Has either of you ever inherited a house or flat, or any proceeds from the sale of 
house or flat, from your parents or anyone else?” 
 
iii) The dummy variables that control for early/ late retirement apply only to retirees. 
Under the dummy “Has retired early” we have classified those retirees that they chose  
 
 
27 The lower bound of the highest band is considered.   40 
 
to retire early and this was not due to health problems or because they made 
redundant/ dismissed (one of the following reasons was given: 4- was offered 
reasonable financial terms to retire early or take voluntary redundancy  5- to spend 
more time with partner/ family 6- to enjoy life while still young/ fit 7- fed up with job/ 
wanted a change 8- to retire at same time as husband/ wife 9- to give younger 
generation a chance). On the other hand the dummy “Has retired late” represents 
those that chose to retire later for economic reasons (1- to improve financial position).    
  
iv) Note that information on the following subjective views is available only at a 
benefit unit level (thus these dummies are included only in the estimation of models 
that use observations on benefit units).    
“Thinking of how you are managing on your money at the moment, would you say 
you are: 
1- Managing very well  2- Managing quite well  3- just getting by  4- getting into 
difficulties” 
   For those giving the answers 1 or 2 our dummy “Satisfied with the management of 
financial holdings” takes the value one. 
 
“The things people buy and do - their housing, furniture, food, leisure activities, etc - 
make up their standard of living. How satisfied do you feel with the standard of living 
at present?  
1- Very Satisfied  2- Fairly Satisfied  3- Neither Satisfied, nor dissatisfied 4- Fairly 
dissatisfied  5- Very dissatisfied”  
For those answering 4 or 5 our dummy “Dissatisfied with the standard of living” takes 
the value one.  
 
 